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A crucial aspect in network monitoring for security purposes is the visual inspection of the traffic
pattern, mainly aimed to provide the network manager with a synthetic and intuitive representation of
the current situation. Towards that end, neural projection techniques can map high-dimensional data
into a low-dimensional space adaptively, for the user-friendly visualization of monitored network
traffic. This work proposes two projection methods, namely, cooperative maximum likelihood Hebbian
learning and auto-associative back-propagation networks, for the visual inspection of network traffic.
This set of methods may be seen as a complementary tool in network security as it allows the visual
inspection and comprehension of the traffic data internal structure. The proposed methods have been
evaluated in two complementary and practical network-security scenarios: the on-line processing of
network traffic at packet level, and the off-line processing of connection records, e.g. for post-mortem
analysis or batch investigation. The empirical verification of the projection methods involved two
experimental domains derived from the standard corpora for evaluation of computer network intrusion
detection: the MIT Lincoln Laboratory DARPA dataset.
& 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Network monitoring systems supervise the traffic in computer
networks [7,42] and generate alerts, or trigger defensive actions,
when suspect activities are detected. The traditional approach to
intrusion prevention mostly entails two paradigms, namely,
misuse intrusion detection (MID) [5] and anomaly intrusion
detection (AID) [28], but scientific issues remain open in the
deployment and operation of those technologies. MID systems
rely on a base of rules to discriminate normal traffic from known
attack patterns, hence they require continuous updating; AID
systems generate alerts when detecting ‘abnormal’ events that
deviate from normal traffic distribution, hence they can support
time-zero detection of novel attack strategies but may suffer from
a relatively high rate of false positives [31].
Visual inspection of traffic patterns is an alternative and crucial
aspect in network monitoring [6]. Visualization is a critical issue in the
computer network defence environment, as it mainly aims to provide
the network manager with a synthetic and intuitive representation of
the current situation; as a result, several researches have recently
applied information visualization to this challenging task
[4,13,20,23,30,39,55]. Visualization techniques typically aim to make
the available statistics from traffic-monitoring systems (IDSs, IPS’s)
understandable in an interactive way, thus focusing on traffic data andll rights reserved.
corchado@ubu.es (E. Corcha
nino@unige.it (R. Zunino).not only on the network topology. However implemented, such a
technology requires mapping high-dimensional feature data into a
low-dimensional space for presentation. The baseline of the research
presented in this work is that connectionist models can prove quite
adequate for that purpose of traffic visualization through dimension-
ality reduction.
The statistical technique of principal component analysis (PCA)
[21,44] was applied as a dimensionality-reduction tool for
visualization of network traffic in some previous works by other
authors [64,66]. In [64], network traffic is visualized through PCA,
but attacks cannot be distinguished from normal traffic. Further-
more, an explanation of the projection obtained by this technique
is not yielded. On the other hand, [66] proposes the PCA-based
visualization as a complementary tool to interpret the results
obtained by a different statistical analysis. This PCA visualization,
employing 12 packet features, does not allow the identification of
attacks on its own. Previous work on traffic visualization also
includes the application of a visualization tool for intrusion
detection [67]. Although some attacks are visually identified in
that work by combining visualization and fuzzy feature extrac-
tion, explanations about the projection technique and the
identification process are not provided.
Neural models have already been applied to the empirical
development of network systems for traffic monitoring, by using
both supervised [2,19,34,35,36,38,41,43,46,51,53,56,57,60,62] and
unsupervised methods [14,24,27,37,45,50,58,61] for automated
detection. The present study shows that neural paradigms can
also effectively support visualization tasks in the field of network
security and provide a proper explanation of the obtained traffic
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projection techniques operate on a feature-space representation
of unlabelled network traffic, and learn the significant patterns
that support the distribution of normal traffic, whereas outliers
mark abnormal events. Hence, the framework can eventually help
the network manager to understand the internal structure and
behaviour of the traffic data, subsequently allowing the identifica-
tion of anomalous situations.
Therefore, the key role of the neural components is to support
an effective, two-/three-dimensional representation of network
traffic in an adaptive fashion. A connectionist approach appears
consistent with the anomaly-detection problem setting, mainly
because the system can learn the relationship between raw traffic
and subsequent interpretation empirically and based on different
statistical features. The crucial advantage is that the outlier-
detection method does not require any a priori analytical
formulation of the underlying dynamical phenomenon.
This work analyses the properties of two neural projection
paradigms for the visualization task, namely auto-associative back-
propagation (AABP) networks [29], and cooperative maximum like-
lihood Hebbian learning (CMLHL) networks [8], comparing their
results with those obtained by PCA and linear discriminant analysis
(LDA) [15]. The AABP approach stems from an unsupervised variant of
multi-layer perceptrons (MLPs) and operates as a ‘smart compression’
operator by implementing universal non-linear approximations. The
CMLHL extends the maximum likelihood Hebbian learning (MLHL)
[11,18], which represents a neural implementation of exploratory
projection pursuit (EPP) [17,22].
The experimental domain adopted to compare the performance of
those projection paradigms involves two typical and complementary
scenarios in practical network monitoring applications. On-line
processing supports a continuous inspection of network progress at
packet level; hence, anomaly detection can be said successful when
significant deviations from normality are represented consistently in a
visual manner. Off-line processing takes into account connection
records, e.g. for post-mortem analysis or batch investigation, and
therefore helps the analyst identify abnormal patterns for further
analysis and defence deployment.
This research shows that the CMLHL model and the AABP
model provide effective techniques to address the two different
applicative scenarios. CMLHL represents a reliable tool to work
out independent factors in a dataset while preserving a global
ordering (such as the temporal order) in the patterns; thus, such
model can be profitably applied to on-line processing of network
traffic. On the other hand, AABP provides a powerful technique to
tackle applicative domains characterized by large datasets invol-
ving non-linear correlations between variables, such as the off-line
processing of connection records.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the
AABP model and the CMLHL model, while Section 3 presents the
proposed framework for visualization of monitored network
traffic. Section 4 describes the datasets used in the experimental
session, which were both derived from the well-known 1998
DARPA/MIT Lincoln Laboratory evaluation benchmark [63]. Ex-
perimental results are presented in Section 5, whereas the final
section winds up the discussion by providing the conclusions and
a number of proposals for future work.Fig. 1. A three-layer AABP network supports a lossy compression of input data.2. Neural projection techniques
2.1. Auto-associative back-propagation networks for dimensionality
reduction
Auto-associative back-propagation networks constitute an unsu-
pervised variant of the general multi-layer perceptron model, whichbelongs to the feedforward class of neural networks [48]. The MLP
model implements a stimulus–response behaviour by combining
several layers of elementary units (neurons), which involve a simple,
non-linear transformation of weighted inputs. A conventional MLP
includes three layers (input, ‘hidden’ and output), and associates an
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where s( ) is the sigmoidal function, Nh is the depth of the sigmoid
series expansion and W represents the coefficients of the weights for
the interconnections between the layers. Empirical fitting drives the
weights, W, so that the network best reproduces (in a Euclidean sense)
the desired mapping over a given training set. The network-training
problem is tackled effectively by the back-propagation (BP) algorithm
[48], which uses a stochastic gradient-descent strategy over the
weight space.
The AABP model changes the conventional MLP structure by
forcing the desired outputs to coincide with the network inputs:
tx (Fig. 1). Forcing the network to replicate the training sample
distribution mainly aims at a reduction in dimensionality, since
the hidden layer is typically smaller than the input/output ones.
At run-time, an AABP network is used to associate with each
input vector the coding values computed by the hidden neurons;
these ‘mapping outputs’ actually support the (lossy) transforma-
tion from the input space to a lower-dimensional representation.
Theory proved [29] that a three-layer AABP network (Fig. 1)
supports a mapping that is affine (if not equivalent) to PCA [21,44].
Quite in view of this equivalence, it clearly appears that such a
compression mapping might eventually suffer from the same
drawbacks affecting PCA-like representations, the most promi-
nent of which is a considerable sensitivity to the presence of
outliers in the training set. It is indeed known that the
eigenvectors induced by linear mappings can rotate significantly
when the PCA-based training includes abnormal data points. That
consideration, together with the ability of universal approxima-
tion theoretically ascribed to the back-propagation model [48],
lead to a more sophisticated model of AABP networks, which
anyway adhere to the basic principle of unsupervised training. The
output layer still remaps the input vector values, and a hidden
compression layer still supports a dimensionality reduction. The
basic difference is in the compression and reconstruction sections,
as both include an additional layer of neurons, thereby leading to
a five-layer auto-associative network (Fig. 2). The mapping
supported by such architecture was called non-linear principal
component analysis (NLPCA) [29].
The run-time use of the resulting network, after training
completion, is totally equivalent to the use of three-layer AABP
networks: the output values of the coding layer (‘mapping
outputs’) provide the low-dimensional representation of each
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ity) conveyed by the NLPCA augmentation is remarkable. The
lower half of the network, also called the ‘compression section’,
actually embeds a complete three-layer BP network, and therefore
benefits from the universal capabilities predicted by theory [48].
The critical issue, of course, is that no one can know the proper
target values that should be imposed to the compression layer of
Nh units for a conventional BP training process. To work around
that issue, NLPCA forces the network to reconstruct the original
sample in the upper section, hence target values in the innermost
layer are set implicitly. As a consequence, the ‘reconstruction’
section is symmetrical with respect to the compression section, in
order to yield equivalent, universal (inverse) mapping capabilities.
The crucial advantage is that the compressed representation is
no longer linked to any linear model but stems from a universal
internal representation, which is learned empirically. On the other
hand, the complexity of the augmented model is apparent, and
the weight-tuning process might turn out to be quite difficult due
to the large number of free parameters. This possibly gives rise to
the presence of local minima, especially when dealing with
limited training sets, and optimized learning algorithms are often
applied to tame training complexity [3].
In summary, NLPCA techniques seem to fit those domains for
which (1) a non-linear representation is required to best
encompass the observed empirical phenomenon, and at the same
time, (2) a considerable number of empirical samples is available.
2.2. Cooperative maximum likelihood Hebbian learning model
The cooperative maximum likelihood Hebbian learning model
[8] extends the maximum likelihood Hebbian learning [11,18]
model, which is based on exploratory projection pursuit [17,22].
The statistical method of EPP was designed for solving the
complex problem of identifying structure in high-dimensional
data by projecting it onto a lower-dimensional subspace in which
its structure is searched by eye. In order to do that, an ‘index’ must
be defined to measure the varying degrees of interest associated
with each projection. Subsequently, the data are transformed by
maximizing the index and the associated interest. From a
statistical point of view the most interesting directions are those
that are as non-Gaussian as possible.
The MLHL model is based on the negative feedback network
and, as the AABP model; it associates an input vector, x 2 D, with
an output vector, y 2 Q . In this case, the output of the network (y)Fig. 2. A non-linear auto-associative back-propagation network includes five





where Wij is the weight linking input j to output i.
Once the output of the network has been calculated, the
activation ðejÞ is fed back through the same weights and
subtracted from the input:




Finally, the learning rule determines the way in which the weights
are updated:
DWij ¼ Z  yi signðejÞjejjp1 ð4Þ
where Z is the learning rate and p is a parameter related to the
energy function.
The main difference between the basic MLHL model and its
cooperative version is the introduction of lateral connections.
After the feed forward step (Eq. (2)) and before the feed back step
(Eq. (3)), lateral connections between the output neurons are
applied as follows:
yiðt þ 1Þ ¼ ½yiðtÞ þ tðb AyÞþ ð5Þ
where t is the ‘strength’ of the lateral connections, b is the bias
parameter and A is a symmetric matrix used to modify the
response to the data [8]. Its effect is based on the relation between
the distances among the output neurons.3. Neural projection techniques for network traffic
monitoring
3.1. A neural perspective for visual traffic monitoring
The visualization of traffic in computer networks typically
aims to help network managers diagnose performance issues or
understand communication patterns between nodes. The mon-
itoring task for detecting intrusive or anomalous events can be
achieved by visualizing data at different levels of abstraction:
network topology, intrusion alerts, packet-level data, etc.
The neural approach presented in this work applies projection
techniques to the mapping of raw network traffic data into a low-
dimensional space for visual inspection. Network traffic is
represented by a set of numerical features spanning a D-
dimensional vector space. The neural component operates on
such feature vectors and yields a two-/three-dimensional repre-
sentation of the observed traffic data. Eventually, the outcomes of
this neural module are presented to the network manager in a
‘traffic display’ device. Hence, the framework is designed to
support integrated visualization systems for computer network
defence by providing an effective tool to analyse network traffic.
The applicative domain involves two typical and complemen-
tary scenarios in network monitoring: on-line processing of
network traffic proceeds at the packet level, and off-line processing
takes into account traffic data summarized in connection records,
e.g. for incident analysis. The former environment supports a
continuous inspection of network progress by analysing indivi-
dual packets, which are intercepted by some network capture
device. In this case, anomaly detection succeeds when significant
deviations from normality are represented consistently in a visual
manner in real (or almost real-) time. From a different perspective,
the off-line processing approach performs intrusion detection in a
batch environment to improve the accuracy and depth of the
analysis. Information about the observed connections spans the
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analyst to identify abnormal traffic patterns for further analysis
and defence deployment.3.2. AABP and CMLHL for dimensionality reduction
Various dimensionality reduction techniques have been pro-
posed in the literature [16]. Linear mapping methods do not yield
satisfactory representations, as real data most often show non-
linear relationships that cannot be approximated accurately by
linear methods [16]. Conversely, non-linear methods for dimen-
sionality reduction [12,16,25,32,40,47,49,52,54,59] offer flexibility
and effectiveness, although such techniques may bring about an
additional complexity. In this regard, the present work exploits
neural projection paradigms to achieve two crucial advantages.
Firstly, a connectionist approach appears consistent with the
anomaly-detection problem setting, mainly because it allows a
system to empirically learn the input–output relationship be-
tween raw traffic and subsequent interpretation. The important
advantage is that the eventual non-linear mapping method does
not require any a priori analytical formulation of the underlying
phenomenon. Secondly, neural projection models do not involve
the complexity drawbacks that characterize the techniques based
on the reliable multidimensional scaling (MDS) model [12], which
in general require the computation of the complete distance
matrix between pairs of data. This in turn represents a major issue
when large datasets are involved.
The CMLHL model and the AABP model represent two different
implementations of the unsupervised neural projection paradigm.
Indeed, they provide effective techniques to address the two
applicative scenarios targeted by this research. CMLHL represents
a reliable tool to work out independent factors in a dataset while
preserving a global ordering in the patterns; thus, such model can
be profitably applied to on-line processing of network traffic. The
CMLHL model was initially applied to the field of artificial vision
[8,9] to identify local filters in space and time. It can also be
successfully applied to a wide variety of problems as, by including
lateral connections, it provides sparse projections that show the
inner structure of datasets. As it is shown in Section 5, CMLHL
successfully supports the on-line analysis of network data,
identifying anomalies in a clearer way than any other of the
tested and well-known projection techniques. Fig. 3 gives an
outline of the run-time operation of the CMLHL-based
dimensionality reduction. On the other hand, the NLPCARun-time operation algorithm of the CMLHL-based procedure 
0. (Initialization)
1. For each time slot: 
a. Acquire traffic datum 
b. Extract numerical features from packe
c. Associate with the packet datum a D-d
d. Feed the CMLHL network with vector x 
e. Register the mapping vector, y, spann
   neurons
f. Feed the visual interface to the netw
Time slot for visual update rate
Inputs:random neural network weights (W)
Fig. 3. The proposed on-line processingarchitecture supported by AABP neural networks represents a
non-linear generalization of standard PCA. Thus, it provides a
powerful technique to tackle applicative domains characterized
by large datasets involving non-linear correlations between
variables, such as the off-line processing of connection records.
According to the set-up discussed in Section 2.1, the
dimensionality reduction module exploits NLPCA to generate a
two-dimensional representation of the monitored traffic by
starting from the D-dimensional space defined by the feature
set. Thus, first a batch training phase uses the empirical dataset
O ¼ fxi; i ¼ 1; . . . ;NO; xi 2 Dg to set the configuration of weight
quantities W for the neural network. Then, the eventual neural
system is applied to process the feature vectors generated at run-
time and to feed the visual display. Fig. 4 gives an outline of the
run-time operation of the NLPCA-based dimensionality reduction.4. Experimental domains
The experimental domains adopted to compare the perfor-
mances of the two projection paradigms involved both of the
scenarios discussed above in practical network monitoring
applications, namely, on-line processing (packet level) and off-line
processing (connection level). Additionally, PCA and LDA have been
applied to these scenarios as a comparative study. The well-
known DARPA intrusion detection dataset [63] provided the
testbeds used in the experiments as it is still the reference
network traffic dataset. The DARPA corpus was assembled in 1998
and 1999; it provided a standard to evaluate both false-alarm
rates and detection rates of intrusion detection systems, including
a variety of known and new attacks buried in a large amount of
normal (‘background’) traffic. The corpus was collected from a
simulation network that was used to automatically generate
realistic traffic, including attempted attacks.
The DARPA corpus provides a widely used benchmark for
intrusion detection evaluation on network traffic at the packet
level. Furthermore, this corpus has been processed to generate a
database of connection records, which was originally created for
the Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining
Tools Competition [1] and widely known as the KDDCup’99
dataset. Hence, this research exploited the two databases to set up
the experimental domains for the two different scenarios
addressed in this work.t headers 
imensional feature vector, x  
ed by the output-layer
ork manager with vector y. 
 and parameters (η,τ,p)
algorithm for packet-based data.
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Run-time operation algorithm of the AABP-based procedure   
0.(Initialization)
 Inputs:neural network weights, W
 Time slot for visual update rate    
1. For each time slot:
   a. Acquire traffic datum 
   b. Extract numerical features
   c. Associate with the packet datum a D-dimensional feature vector,
      x 
   d. Feed the AABP network with vector x
   e. Register the two-dimensional mapping vector, v, spanned by the
     middle-layer neurons
   f. Feed the visual interface to the network manager with vector v.       
Fig. 4. The proposed run-time operation algorithm of the NLPCA-based dimensionality reduction.
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Tests concerning on-line processing of traffic data involved a
subset of the 1998 DARPA dataset. This subset contains 10 min of
the traffic (3730 packets) captured on the Monday of the second
week, including the portsweep attack generated on that day. In
the DARPA documentation page [63], a portsweep attack is
defined as a surveillance sweep through many ports to determine
which services are supported on a single host. In this sample of
portsweep attack, packets are sent from the host 192.168.1.10 to
the 100 first port numbers of the host 172.16.114.50. As we are
proposing an almost real-time processing of traffic for the on-line
analysis, datasets longer than 10 min are not suitable due to the
delay caused to the visualization of the traffic.
In the present research, transport control protocol (TCP)
packets contained in this subset are characterized by using the
set of features that already proved to be effective for the detection
of anomalous SNMP traffic [10]. Only TCP traffic was selected from
this dataset as most of the attacks (166 out of 174) contained in
the 1998 DARPA corpus are based on this protocol. The set of five
features that are extracted from the packet headers contribute to
build up the neural-network input vector, x 2 5; these features can
be listed as follows: Timestamp: the time when the packet was sent.
 Source port: the port number of the device that sent the packet.
 Destination port: the port number of the target host, i.e. the
host to which the packet is sent.
 Protocol ID: an integer number that identifies the protocol over
TCP of the packet.
 Size: the packet size (in bytes).
As such, the TCP network traffic is mapped in a five-dimensional
feature space. By summarizing packet information in this reduced
set of features, the proposed framework is able to monitor high
volume networks. On the other hand, as a result of using only
packet header features, this framework is not able to identify
attacks concerning the packet payload.
4.2. Off-line processing of network traffic
The experimental reference adopted for the off-line processing
of connection records was originally created for the ThirdInternational Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools
Competition [1]. The KDDCup’99 dataset [1] originated from the
1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program managed by
MIT Lincoln Labs [33], with the objective to survey and evaluate
research in intrusion detection. That work resulted in a reference
set of data, including a wide variety of attacks, which had been
simulated in a military network environment.
The data spanned a 41-dimensional feature space; each pattern
encompassed cumulative information about a connection session.
In addition to ‘normal’ traffic, attacks belonged to four principle
macro-classes, namely, ‘DoS’ (denial-of-service), ‘R2L’ (unauthor-
ized access from a remote machine), ‘U2R’ (unauthorized access to
local ‘super user’ privileges) and ‘probing’ (surveillance and other
probing such as port scanning). The complete training set
contained about 5106 patterns, covering 22 different types of
attacks. Normal traffic represented about 20% of the whole
dataset, while attack types were quite unbalanced, as just two
classes (‘neptune’ and ‘smurf’) spanned 78% of the entire dataset.
The pattern descriptors that took on categorical values, most
notably ‘protocol’ and ‘service’, were remapped into a numerical
representation. ‘protocol’ could assume three different values
(TCP, UDP and ICMP) and was therefore encoded by a triplet of
bits; each element of the triplet was associated to a protocol, and
only one of those could be non-null. The ‘service’ descriptor took
on 11 possible values, and was remapped accordingly into 11
mutually exclusive coordinates. In summary, the patterns forming
the eventual dataset used in the experiments included 53-
dimensional feature vectors.
For simplicity, the experimental sessions in this research
involved a smaller training set, provided by the KDDCup’99
benchmark, which had been obtained by subsampling original
training data at a 10% rate. The resulting ‘10% training set’
included 494,021 patterns and preserved the original proportions
among the five principal macro-categories cited above. The test
set provided by the KDD challenge contained 311,029 patterns,
and featured 17 ‘novel’ attack schemes that were not covered by
the training set.5. Experimental results
The experimental verification of the projection methods
compared the performances of some projection models (CMLHL,
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the two datasets described above, fitting the proposed on-line/off-
line analysis.
This section contains some different projections, whose
dimensions correspond to the outputs of the different applied
projection models. Thus, the represented axes can be seen as
combinations (linear or non-linear) of the features contained in
the original datasets.5.1. On-line traffic analysis
The CMLHL paradigm was tested by using the dataset
described in Section 4.1. The dataset contained network packets
captured from TCP traffic that were characterized by a feature set
spanning a five-dimensional space, including time information
plus Protocol ID, Source Port, Destination Port and Size.
Fig. 5 shows that the CMLHL projection manages to identify the
anomalous situation contained in the dataset. The portsweep
attack (Group 1 in Figs. 5a and b) is identified due to their non-
parallel evolution to the normal traffic. As it can be seen, normal
traffic evolves in parallel straight lines (Normal direction in Figs.
5a and b), but the packets contained in these anomalous situation




Fig. 5. CMLHL projections on the dataset involving on-line traffic analysis. (a) Project
portsweep attack (from Fig. 5a).intrinsic robustness of CMLHL, which is able to respond properly
to a complex dataset that includes time as a variable.
For comparison purposes, well-known projection techniques,
such as PCA [21,44] and LDA [15], have been applied under the
same framework. Fig. 6 compares the projection obtained by PCA
(Fig. 6a) and LDA (Fig. 6b).
The PCA projection through the two first principal components
(Fig. 6a) accounts for the 99.79% of the data variance and is not
able to distinguish the portsweep attack (Group 1 in Fig. 6a) from
normal traffic as some packets related to normal traffic are located
in Group 1 as well. The ‘symmetry’ of this projection is caused by
the two-way (from source to destination and from destination to
source) of most of the traffic. Fig. 6b presents the results obtained
by applying LDA, which is a supervised statistical technique that
maximizes the ratio of between-class variance to the within-class
variance in the provided dataset, maximizing the separability of
the data. Hence, class labels were assigned to packets contained in
the analysed dataset in order to apply LDA. Fig. 6b shows that the
LDA projection does not allow the identification of the portsweep
attack, depicted in the same way as normal traffic. This validates
the unsupervised approach for visual traffic inspection versus this
supervised projection approach.
Finally, a comparison between CMLHL and AABP is provided. It
can be seen in Fig. 5 how CMLHL is able to identify the anomalous
situations included in the on-line dataset as it has been explainedup 1




Fig. 6. Comparative projections of PCA and LDA on the dataset involving on-line
traffic analysis. (a) PCA projection (through the two first principal components)
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Fig. 7. AABP projection on the dataset involving on-line traffic analysis.
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which is able to properly respond to a complex dataset that
includes time as a variable.
In the case of AABP (Fig. 7), this issue is not clear at all when
using the time as one of the input variables. Including a linear
growing variable (time) forced the two inner neurons to learn a
linear path. Furthermore, the projections do not allow to separate
attacks from normal traffic.
Thus, we can conclude that CMLHL performs better than the
other three projection methods for the on-line analysis as it has
managed to identify the anomalous situation existing in the
analysed dataset based on the behaviour of the traffic data
evolution.
5.2. Off-line traffic analysis
Connection-level traffic analysis tools (for example, in log-
correlation applications) often aggregate statistical descriptions of
the intervened exchanges but do not render the timing features of
the completed traffic progression. Thus, a visualization tool for
analysing this data typically is expected to reproduce regularpatterns in the traffic distribution and at the same time to
highlight anomalies that can trigger peer investigations by the
network manager.
The AABP model can prove quite profitable towards that end,
especially in view of its universal representation ability. In the
experiments, the KDDCup’99 dataset was used to generate a
reduced description of data, supported by 5 features of the
original 53 descriptors explained in Section 4.2. These features
were selected in accordance with the previous results in the
literature [26,27], which reported the best classification perfor-
mance. The AABP network architecture featured a compression
layer (and accordingly a reconstruction layer) including Nh ¼ 5
neurons. These crucial values were set by using the classical,
empirical criterion proposed in [48] in order to favour proper
generalization performance. The actual projection test involved a
two-/three-dimensional coding space in the middle layer of the
AABP architecture.
The network was trained on the KDD 10% training dataset, then
the trained networks were fed with the KDD test set, and weights
were not allowed to change. The pair/triplet of output values from
the coding layer were used for visualization in the two-/three-
dimensional graph. Fig. 8 gives the obtained results for these two
different projection configurations; the axes give the output
values from the (innermost-layer) coding neurons. Each point in
the graph represents a pattern of the KDD (test) dataset, whereas
the marker at each point denotes whether the associate pattern
originated from normal or malicious traffic. It is worth stressing
that, in this case, using the macro-classes that characterized the
original KDD datasets may not be very informative, as the test set
included types and patterns of attacks that were not included in
the training set, hence anomaly detection is more important than
actual classification accuracy. This also seems consistent with the
unsupervised nature of the overall approach.
The graphs witness the intricate distribution of the KDD data,
and also indirectly confirm the known complexity in the specific
dataset; the original KDD statement reported that the test set was
drawn from a different distribution with respect to the training
set. Nevertheless, the projections allow assessing the effectiveness
of the AABP unsupervised method: the two-dimensional graph
(Fig. 8a) exhibits two main ‘patterns’ (groups) of traffic, which are
mostly consistent with the class distribution of the patterns
included in each group. A similar situation is obtained in Fig. 8b,
where class separation (normal vs. attacks) is less evident. This
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Fig. 8. AABP projections on the dataset involving off-line traffic analysis. (a) Two-dimensional projection and (b) three-dimensional projection.
Fig. 9. Comparative projections on the dataset involving off-line traffic analysis. (a) PCA projection of the off-line analysis dataset and (b) LDA projection of the off-line
analysis dataset.
Fig. 10. CMLHL projection on the dataset involving off-line traffic analysis.
A. Herrero et al. / Neurocomputing 72 (2009) 3649–36583656can be possibly ascribed to the increased dimensionality in the
projection space and the consequent increased complexity in
separating patterns, also considering the unsupervised nature of
the training process. However, the graph still confirms the
existence of two main patterns of traffic data in the test set.
The same datasets (both training and test) were mapped by
using PCA and LDA projection methods. Fig. 9a gives a sample of a
two-dimensional projection resulting from PCA; similar results
were obtained with LDA and are reported in Fig. 9b.
Finally, a comparison between AABP and CMLHL for off-line
traffic analysis is provided. It can be seen in Fig. 10 how CMLHL
provides a more sparse projection than those obtained by PCA and
LDA.
In all cases, the projection methods managed to indicate a two-
tiered data distribution, although it seems that the associated
groups did not render the underlying distributions of traffic
classes, as normal and malicious traffic were mapped in an
overlapped fashion. This seems to limit the effectiveness of those
approaches detecting anomalies in a complex scenario.6. Conclusions
Traffic analysis in large networks is a complex task, mainly due
to the intensity and the heterogeneous nature of the dynamictraffic phenomenon observed. Visualization tools can provide the
network manager with automated support and motivate their
effectiveness in the ability of the human eye to extrapolate normal
traffic patterns and detect anomalies therein. Of course, the
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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the ability to render the traffic distribution in a consistent yet low-
dimensional representation. Hence, visualization tools can be
employed as complementary tools to other security mechanisms.
The research presented in this paper shows that unsupervised
models from computational intelligence enhance those compres-
sion and visualization tasks by their ability to learn empirical
data distributions and perform pattern coding in a very efficient
manner. Additionally, unsupervised learning does not require
a labelled dataset as supervised learning does. Thus, raw
information extracted from the travelling packets is enough to
train such models.
This paper compared several methods for unsupervised
adaptive compression towards that end, and distinguished the
different operating scenarios that characterize a network man-
ager’s reasoning, namely, on-line traffic inspection for early
detection of anomalies, and off-line traffic pattern analysis for
post-mortem or batch analysis.
The basic scientific approach found two associated methods for
implementation, i.e., cooperative maximum likelihood Hebbian
learning and auto-associative back-propagation networks. The
presented results showed that those theoretical paradigms could
support the compression (and subsequent visualization) task very
effectively, as the methods managed to discriminate normal from
anomalous traffic data with a satisfactory accuracy. The methods
also compared favourably with respect to classical approaches to
data compression such as principal component analysis and linear
discriminant analysis.
On the other hand, one cannot easily perform a fair comparison
between the present framework and other visualization methods
proposed in the literature. To the best of the authors’ knowledge,
the projection on a two-/three-dimensional space of the network
traffic to support visualization has been slightly considered in the
previous works. Only PCA [64,65] has been applied to this task,
getting low-performance results. The experimental results con-
tained in this work outperform the above mentioned, as the
former are based on higher-order statistics. Furthermore, this
work goes one step further, providing a detailed explanation about
the way in which the anomalous situations are detected. Several
researches have exploited connectionist paradigms to tackle the
intrusion detection task; however, those approaches did not target
visualization. As a result, a proper comparison between the
performance attained by the proposed research and those
obtained by the IDS-oriented approaches cannot be provided.
Then, this research line may be seen as an alternative and/or
complementary tool under the frame of network security.
Current lines of investigation in this area mainly address the
implementation of the proposed neural models in embedded
electronic systems for mission-critical appliances and the refine-
ment of the proposed techniques to enhance accuracy and
consistency in the representation of the observed traffic. Addi-
tionally, the proposed framework is based on minimal traffic
measurement [65]. Characterizing network packets by a reduced
set of packet header features allows high-volume networks
monitoring.Acknowledgement
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